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Love mysticism, long viewed as the finest expression
of religious experience in Islam, has been displaced
in the past two decades with 'frontline/hate mysti-
cism'. This militarized spirituality was nurtured in the
1980s by Iranian theologues, who during the war
with Iraq promised prospective teenage martyrs 'as-
cendance' to heaven. Soon adopted by Islamist ac-
tivists in other parts of the world, this vengeful
modality of piety was an extension of a politicized
spirituality that emerged in the aftermath of World
War I by redefining the East as spiritual.
Frontline Mysticism
and Eastern Spirituality
The first part of the following retrospective
essay examines the particularity of hate
mysticism; the second identifies the founda-
tional assumptions concerning the Orient
and the Occident that allowed for the politi-
cization of spirituality in the 20t h century.
Hate mysticism
The tragic events of September 11 were
products of a militarized religious subjectivi-
ty, a subjectivity that was labelled as 'front-
line Gnosticism' (cirfan-i jabhahyi) by the
Iranian-Islamist art ideologue Murtiza Avini.1
Avini articulated this concept in a commen-
tary on Ayatullah Khumayni's September
1988 letter to Islamic revolutionary artists.
In his letter Khumayni radically redefined
'artists' as those 'wise' individuals who shed
their 'pure blood' on 'the front-line of love
and martyrdom'. Turning to the convention-
al notion of art, Khumayni asserted that
'[b]eautiful and pure art is one that clashes
with modern capitalism and with the blood-
sucking communism and destroys the Islam
of comfort and luxury, the eclectic Islam, the
Islam of compromise and ignobility, the
Islam of the pain-free comfort-seekers, and
in one word the American Islam [Islam-i Am-
rikayi].' Khumayni advised artists 'to engage
only in an art that teaches the path of clash-
ing with the globe-mongers of the East and
the West who are headed by the [United
States of] America and the Soviet [Union].'2
By denouncing non-combative piety and re-
ligiosity as 'American Islam' in the course of
the Iran-Iraq War of 1980Ð1988, Khumayni
and other Iranian theologues established a
distinctive paradigm of militarized spirituali-
ty. While claiming to represent 'the pure
Muhammadan Islam' (Islam-i nab-i Muham-
madi), this modality of piety negated the
most cherished aspect of Islamic religious
experience that has been historically exem-
plified by love mysticism.
With the intensification of the Iran-Iraq
war in the 1980s, Iranian war theologues
promoted the themes of resistance, self-sac-
rifice and martyrdom. During that period,
'martyrdom-seeking' was promoted as a
fundamental distinction of the Islamic Revo-
lution.3 By sacrificing oneself for the Islamic
nation and the revolution, which were
under assault by Iraq, the martyrs were
guaranteed ascendance (curuj), a vertical
movement toward heaven and God. Replac-
ing the linear and temporal concept of
'progress' as the organizing element of po-
litical discourse, the concept of 'ascen-
dance' promoted a directional shift from a
horizontal movement towards a desirable
future to a vertical movement to a heavenly
afterlife. Whereas Iranian revolutionary dis-
course promoted a collective march to-
wards 'freedom' and the Islamic Republic,
the war discourse publicized the individual-
ized heavenward ascendance of the
'avenger of God' and the 'revolutionary
guards'.
While this vertical ascendance had affinity
with the medieval Gnostic concepts of per-
fection (kamal) and union (vasl), it rested
upon a radically different form of subjectivi-
ty. In its medieval articulation, ascendance
was viewed as attainable only through soli-
tude, asceticism, and the rejection of the
material world. But the ascendance that was
promised to the martyrs during the Iran-Iraq
war was indeed a displacement of the patri-
otic willingness to die and to kill for one's
own homeland. This theological 'insurance'
for well being in the afterlife of the martyrs
was also deployed by the Afghani Mu-
jahidin, the Pakistani Sipah-i Sahaba, the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hizb
Allah, and the Palestinian Hamas sodalities.
Thus 'martyrdom' and 'ascendance' became
significant components of nationalized reli-
gious rhetoric. This new military rhetoric
was sanctified by resorting to the Qur'an
and the tradition of Prophet Muhammad.
But the architects of this rhetoric conve-
niently forget to explain that the Prophet
Muhammad and early Muslim warriors
never referred to their military endeavours
as jihad and did not hail a comrade who
died on the warfront as a martyr. By de-his-
toricizing and naturalizing jihad and martyr-
dom, in the past two decades these varie-
gated concepts have been utilized for the
purpose of endowing religious sanctity on
combative subjectivity. It was such a com-
bative subjectivity that was hailed as 'front-
line mysticism' by the Iranian ideologue
Murtiza Avini.
Unlike historical Islamic love mysticism,
which has been predominantly apolitical
and introspective, frontline mysticism is
consciously political and vengeful. Instead
of meditation and solitary contemplation
for the purpose of annihilating the ego-cen-
tred self (an endeavour which was called
'the greater jihad'), frontline religious ac-
tivists publicly propagate their will through
physical self-annihilation. Unlike the love-
mystics who encouraged ascetic endeav-
ours for the goal of unity with the Other,
contemporary religious activists are im-
pelled to violently eliminate the Other
through physical self-annihilation.
In contradistinction to the solitary and pri-
vatized subjectivity of medieval mystics
who sought to obliterate the Satan within
themselves, the religiously inspired activists
of our time are informed by a globalized vi-
sion of oppression, injustice, inequality and
tyranny, all construed as the material mani-
festations of the Great Satan. Often identi-
fied with the United States and its foreign
policies, this externalized, politicized, and
territorialized Satan is considered as arro-
gant as the biblical Satan who refused to
obey the divine command of bowing down
to Adam. The physical identification of
Satan with the United States has radically al-
tered the notion of mystical journey. Where-
as the mystical journey of the earlier times
involved ascetic passages of self-discovery,
in the militarized piety of our time 'the jour-
ney' is defined as a suicidal mission for the
obliteration of the Other through physical
self-annihilation.
The approaching self-annihilation was an-
ticipated in a note found in the handbag of
Muhammad cAtta, a commander of the Sep-
tember 11 attack on the World Trade Cen-
ter: 'The time of judgement has arrived.
Hence we need to utilize those few hours to
ask God for forgiveness. You have to be con-
vinced that those few hours that are left you
in your life are very few. From there you will
begin to live the happy life, the infinite par-
adise.' Prepared for the tragic events of Sep-
tember 11, the suicidal journeymen were
admonished to '[k]eep a very open mind,
keep a very open heart of what you are to
face.' Mentally prepared for the journey, the
note promised: 'You will be entering par-
adise. You will be entering the happiest life,
everlasting life.'
Contrary to conventional Islam, here the
day of judgement is equated with the suc-
cessful execution of the hateful mission.
Consequently, a revengeful destruction of
the Other is conceived as the ultimate
judgement of God. 'The day of judgement'
and 'eternal afterlife', which are convention-
ally postponed to the end of time, are
viewed as contemporaneous with physical
self-annihilation and the destruction of the
Satanized Other. This vengeful piety is a rad-
ical negation of a conventional view of spir-
ituality as composed of compassionate and
merciful acts, the kind of intentional acts
that are identified with God in the Qur'anic
formula of initiation, 'in the name of God the
Compassionate and Merciful'.
The spiritual East
The rhetorical significance of Islam in
modern national-political discourses in the
Middle East and South Asia is foundationally
grounded in an Orientalist epistemological
distinction between the East and the West.
The architects of 19t h- and early 20t h-century
modern political discourses in these two re-
gions accepted the Orientalist postulate of
the non-contemporaneity of Occidental and
Oriental societies. In this 'time-distancing'
postulate, Europe was viewed as modern
and dynamic and the Orient as pre-modern
and static. Both Orientalist and nationalist
discourses attributed the backwardness of
the Muslim Orient to Islam.4 But this as-
sumption was refigured in the aftermath of
WWI. The destructions of WWI prompted
the development of vernacular political
strategies that defined the national selves in
contradistinction to the European Other,
which was increasingly defined as material-
istic. Thus a new generation of European-
educated intellectuals sought to distance
themselves from the assumed materiality of
the West by turning to the contingently
fashioned 'spiritual East'. This counter-Euro-
pean self-recognition as 'spiritual' provided
the epistemological foundation for the in-
creased significance of religion in the na-
tionalist political discourses of South Asia
and the Middle East.
Informed by German New Romanticism
and Oswald Spengler's 'The Decline of the
West', for instance, the post-WWI Iranian in-
telligentsia developed a critical approach to
European civilization by articulating a ver-
nacular modernity, a modernity that was
grounded in the spiritual rejuvenation of
Iran and Islam. In 1924, for instance, Murtiza
Mushfiq Kazimi proposed that Iran needed a
'clerical modernity' (tajadud-i akhund).5 A
year later Habib Allah Pur-i Riza suggested
that what was needed was a 'sacred revolu-
tion' (inqilab-i muqaddas) with 'thinkers like
Luther and Calvin'. Criticizing westerniza-
tion as 'borrowed civilization'6 in 1926, Tuti
Maraghah'i instead called for the develop-
ment of a distinctly Iranian civilization that
could harmonize the antagonistic relations
of the European-mannered intelligentsia
and the Muslim clerisy.7 Husayn Kazimzadah
likewise called for an 'intellectual and reli-
gious revolution', a revolution for 'the purg-
ing of superstitions and superfluities' from
Shicism. Kazimzadah argued that the mater-
ial progress of the West should be synthe-
sized with the spirituality of the East. He
thus prescribed a synthetic modernity that
sought the concordance of 'science with re-
ligion, materiality with spirituality, life with
action, and action with nobility'. Reconfigur-
ing the role of Islam in comprehension of
modernity, in this scenario '[a] modern per-
son must be religious and religious person
must be modern.'8 These ideas informed
Ahmad Kasravi (1890Ð1946) who viewed
the notion of 'European superiority' as a de-
ceptive device for the promotion of colo-
nialism and capitalism.
In his Ethos (Ayin), which was published in
1932, Kasravi offered a comprehensive cri-
tique of European civilization and the mimet-
ic project of 'Europism' (urupayigarayi), a fu-
turist project that viewed the present of the
West as the future of the Rest. Believing that
'Europe faced a dreadful future', Kasravi
called for the purging of the 'malady of Eu-
ropism' and for returning to the noble values
that were trampled upon by the Iranian en-
thusiasts of European ways. In this counter-
European project, religion was to play a piv-
otal role as the foundation for a compassion-
ate, rational and ethical life, which was
viewed as an alternative path of progress and
development that could detour the social
and economic problems of Europe.9 With
varying degrees of sophistication, similar
ideas were articulated by the Indian Muham-
mad Iqbal (1875Ð1938) and Abu al-cAlaMaw-
dudi (1903Ð1979) and the Egyptian Rashid
Riza (1865Ð1935) and Hasan al-Banna (1906Ð
1949). By turning to Islam, these and other
publicists sought to supply the content of
the discursively spirtualized Orient, a turn
that hindered the development of a civil and
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secular political culture in the Middle East
and South Asia.
Viewed as the guardians of fatalism and
expectationalism, the early proponents of
clerical modernity and spiritual revolution
were intensely anti-clerical. In their forma-
tive phase, these calls were calls for the
transformation of a sedimented notion of
religion into a dynamic modern ideology
and culture. For instance Kasravi, whose
contribution to the emergence of Iranian Is-
lamism has been effectively suppressed,
viewed religion as 'humanism' (adamigari)
and as 'the source of worldly prosperity'.1 0
To establish Islam as a counter-Europist
'guide for life', he called for 'the returning of
Islam to its foundation by purging it of the
irrationalities of Sufi predestanarianism and
Shici expectationalism'.1 1 As a rational hu-
manist project, Islam was thus set to provide
both the content of Eastern spirituality and
the perimeters of a modern and progressive
political culture. Overburdened by these
modern requirements, religiosity and spiri-
tuality were increasingly politicized and reli-
gious sodalities assumed the role of political
parties and civil institutions. Early examples
of such associations that contributed to the
formation of Islamic public sphere are the
Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the Indian-
Pakistani Jamacat-i Islami, and the Iranian
Hay'ats, an extensive network of neighbour-
hood associations that emerged all over
Iran between the 1940s and the 1970s.
By claiming authenticity, morality, and
spirituality as their own exclusive domain,
these and other Islamist formations consti-
tuted their secular counterparts as replicas
of the materialistic, immoral, inhumane, and
decadent West. Consequently Islamist for-
mations, instead of contributing to the in-
vigoration of ethical, humanist, and civil val-
ues, have predominantly fostered violence,
intolerance, incivility, and religious bigotry.
As the Western claim of superiority es-
poused colonialism and imperialist domina-
tion, the Eastern claim of spirituality has
likewise produced shameful manifestations
that are contrary to basic norms of human
decency. The events of September 11 are
the latest expression of this degenerated
and vengeful spirituality. As postcolonial
scholars have critiqued the claims of West-
ern exceptionality, it is now urgent that the
foundational assumptions of Eastern spiri-
tuality are likewise deconstructed.
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